
Varieties of Intra-Party Democracy

Conceptualization and Index Construction

Benjamin von dem Berge and Thomas Poguntke

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Robert Michels wrote his sobering study on the quality of intra-party democracy (IPD) in the Wilhelmine Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), political activists and political scientists alike have been concerned with the quality and feasibility of democracy within parties. The literature on this topic is almost endless, and we will not attempt to do justice to it beyond a brief summary of the major strands of the debate in order to lay the foundations for this chapter. Essentially, we pursue three aims here: first, we propose the conceptualization of different variants of IPD; this is followed by the presentation and discussion of valid measurements, before we turn finally to a review of the empirical evidence, as revealed by the application of our IPD indices to the Political Party Database Project (PPDB) data.

Despite widespread attention to democracy within parties it is by no means certain that IPD is an essential element of the democratic order. Adherents of a strictly competitive model of democracy, first and most forcefully suggested by Schumpeter (1950), might even argue that democracy within parties represents an unwelcome obstacle to the efficient competition of political elites for power. At the very minimum, they would regard it as largely superfluous (Allern and Pedersen 2007: 72). Significantly, this disregard for IPD has been reflected in many European constitutions for many years. At the time of writing, less than half of Europe's party laws contain requirements that parties should be internally democratic, even though this has become more widespread in recent years (van Biezen and Piccio 2013: 47f.).

To be sure, many others took contrasting views even though the concern with IPD has probably never been at the core of theorizing on liberal democracy: to this day, liberal democracies struggle with the in-built tension between the free mandate of parliamentarians and the systemic requirements

of party democracy. Arguably, Leibholz's theory of the *Parteienstaat* that was very influential in post-war Germany is an exception in that it regards parties, and IPD, as essential elements of popular sovereignty (Stöss 2001).

More ubiquitous were debates among practitioners and party scholars about the limitations and potential of IPD per se, that is, without explicit reference to the quality of democracy. Traditional left-wing parties, the proverbial externally created mass parties, regarded their parliamentary parties as instruments of the party outside parliament; these were part of a wider social movement based on cleavages that structured the (emerging) age of mass politics. Democratic control of the elites by the mass organization was the essence of this model of party democracy, and Michels' study was inspired by deep disappointment with the deficiencies of IPD (Neumann 1956; Michels 1989; LaPalombara and Weiner 1990). Debates about IPD re-emerged in the wake of the emergence of new left parties in the late 1960s and early 1970s and gained powerful momentum when Green parties (partially) reinvented the wheel—this time IPD was called grassroots democracy (e.g., Poguntke 1987; Kitschelt 1988). Last but not least, some right-wing populist parties discovered IPD as a lever to challenge established parties who were criticized for their alleged elitism. Most recently, the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) has not only used this rhetoric but has also copied some organizational features from the Greens, like dual leadership and the possibility of holding party conferences open to all members. From this perspective, to paraphrase Schattschneider's famous dictum, democracy is unthinkable save in terms of internally democratic parties.

This chapter does not seek to decide the normative debate. Instead, we propose ways of measuring IPD that will facilitate the empirical study of the impact of different variants of IPD on the quality of democracy. We will be able to investigate, for example, whether specific adjustments of IPD may be able to slow down or even stop the widespread erosion of party membership. Likewise, IPD may support the electoral success of parties or encourage a democratic political culture or stimulate political participation (Scarrow 1999; Amundsen 2016). Most importantly, however, we show that theoretically and empirically, IPD is two-dimensional in that assembly-based and plebiscitary modes of decision-making follow different logics.

CONCEPTUALIZING IPD

Identifying Dimensions of IPD

Democracy within parties might have different faces and can be achieved differently by different parties. There are authors who speak about 'specific

variants' or 'versions' of IPD (Young and Cross 2002; Saglie and Heidar 2004; Cross and Katz 2013b). Yet, democratic theory offers us a simple, albeit fundamental distinction between two modes of democratic decision-making that can be fruitfully applied to IPD. Essentially, democratic decision-making follows two fundamentally different logics, namely either direct (plebiscitary) or representative (assembly-based) decision-making (Held 1996; Kriesi 2005). *Assembly-based* decision-making means that those who eventually cast their vote on a certain issue deliberate, exchange ideas and negotiate over alternative options within an assembly or forum. *Plebiscitary* decision-making, on the contrary, disconnects the act of voting from the discussion over the alternatives that are put to a vote. To be sure, there may be a substantial public debate over the substance of a plebiscite but this debate cannot change the alternatives that are put to a vote. In other words, decision-making comes down to an 'either/or'. Of course, any kind of compromise may be achieved in the process that precedes the actual plebiscite, when the alternative options are formulated. But the final decision is dichotomous. Moreover, it is taken by the membership or polity at large in a mass ballot, rather than by those engaged in debate in a particular forum or assembly. Therefore, we identify two main dimensions of IPD: assembly-based IPD and plebiscitary IPD.

From the perspective of intra-party politics, the plebiscitary mode can be subdivided depending on whether the boundaries of the organization are relevant for the definition of the party 'demos' (Cross and Katz 2013b: 4). Some parties have opened up major decisions (frequently over personnel) to anyone who claims to be broadly supportive of the party's general goals, thereby following the model of many US primaries. This calls into question the traditional concept of a political party as a membership-based organization with clear organizational boundaries between those who belong to the organization and those who remain outside. In the case of such parties, the right to participate in certain intra-party decisions is tied to membership status, mostly documented through a regular financial contribution to the party.¹

The Various Aspects of IPD

The discussion above suggests that there cannot be a universally agreed definition of IPD because it is essentially two-dimensional. Consequently, Cross and Katz argue that 'IPD cannot be measured in a way that permits a "scientific" conclusion that one party is more democratic than the other' (Cross and Katz 2013b: 6). To reinforce this argument, the authors compare IPD with democracy at the nation-state level and conclude that '[r]ankings of how democratic various countries are depend on the definition they ascribe to democracy and the same is true for IPD' (ibid.). Nevertheless, there are

several well developed and widely recognized democracy indices which are constructed to measure levels of democracy at the nation state level.² These indices are theoretically derived by defining factors (also called ‘dimensions’ or ‘indicators’) which are considered necessary for democratic political systems. Our way of conceptualizing IPD follows a comparable approach in that we attempt to find the common denominator in the relevant literature that allows us to propose simple yet valid conceptualizations of what we consider to be the principal modes of IPD. The following quote by Cross and Katz represents a suitable point of departure for our conceptual endeavour because it summarizes all central points of the pertinent debates:

Like democracy itself, the definition of IPD is essentially contestable. [a] Is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, centralization, accountability, or something else altogether? [b] Should the emphasis be on outcomes or on process? For example, if inclusiveness is a key consideration, in terms of candidate selection is the concern about the inclusiveness of the selectorate (those who choose the candidates), or is it about the diversity of the group of candidates ultimately selected? [c] And, who is either group meant to be inclusive of – party members, party supporters in the electorate, the electorate generally? (Cross and Katz 2013b: 2; letters added)

a) The central role of inclusiveness. First, we need to decide what constitutes IPD. To follow Cross and Katz, ‘is it primarily about participation, inclusiveness, (de-)centralization, accountability, or something else altogether?’ For several reasons, in our conceptualization IPD equals *inclusiveness*. This is mainly because we maintain that the relevant elements of the other aspects are logically sub-categories of inclusiveness.

According to Scarrow (2005: 6), inclusiveness refers to the question of ‘how wide the circle of party decision makers is’. In exclusive parties, the main decisions like candidate selection, leadership selection and decisions on the manifesto are made by a small number of party actors, that is, the party leadership (a single leader or a small group of leaders). In contrast, in inclusive parties, a large number of party members make decisions on the central issues of the party. From this perspective, inclusiveness is the most important aspect when evaluating how democratic intra-party decision-making processes are (see, e.g., Cross 2008; Kenig 2008, 2009; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Blais 2012; Gauja 2013; Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2013).

This definition of inclusiveness incorporates the important aspects of ‘participation’, ‘centralization’ and—in a wider sense—‘accountability’. The degree of inclusiveness in decision-making on the main party issues like candidate selection, leadership selection and the decision on the manifesto is directly related to the extent of *participation*. The degree of *centralization* is also relevant to IPD, but here the situation is more complex. In *centralized* parties, the main ‘decisions are made by a single group or decision body’ (Scarrow 2005: 6; see

also Bille 2001) at the national level, and are ‘accepted at all levels of the party’, while in decentralized parties the different party layers are represented in national bodies in order to influence decisions at the national party level (von dem Berge et al. 2013). Therefore, decentralization can be seen as an aspect of IPD (Cross 2008: 598f.). But its incorporation into the concept of IPD is at least questionable (see also Rahat and Shapira 2016). First of all, a party can be highly centralized but still have an internally democratic (inclusive) structure. Second, a decentralized (federalized) party can be highly undemocratic (exclusive) within each of its federal components—this would be a stratarchically organized party with exclusive decision-making processes in each of its different vertical layers. However, there is one important difference between a centralized and a decentralized party regarding IPD (inclusiveness): An undemocratic (exclusive) centralized party has only one power centre while an undemocratic (exclusive) decentralized party has several or even many power centres. This means that in a decentralized party there are more party members involved in making decisions simply because there are more power centres. From this perspective a decentralized party is necessarily somewhat more democratic because it is necessarily somewhat more inclusive. Therefore, we argue that our conceptualization of inclusiveness covers the ‘democratic’ aspects of decentralization.

Moreover, our conceptualization of inclusiveness pertains to the most important aspect of *accountability*, namely whether the party leader is accountable to other bodies like the congress. As all other party bodies are more inclusive than the party leader, their decision-making rights automatically mean that they can exert a degree of control over the leader. In the same vein, to the extent that the leader has power over the other party bodies, this has to be seen as exclusive, because the party leader is the most exclusive ‘party body’.

To sum up, we maintain that IPD equals inclusiveness defined in the following terms: (i) the higher the number of party members involved in intra-party decision-making (relative to party size), (ii) the more open the election and composition of party organs (e.g., absence of ex officio seats), and (iii) the more the party leader shares power with other, more inclusive party organs or actors, the more inclusive (and therefore the more ‘democratic’) a party is.

b) Process or outcome. The second question Cross and Katz (2013b: 2) raise is whether the emphasis should be on processes or on outcomes. They ask ‘if inclusiveness is a key consideration, in terms of candidate selection is the concern about the inclusiveness of the selectorate (those who choose the candidates), or is it about the diversity of the group of candidates ultimately selected?’ (Cross and Katz 2013b: 2). In a way, their question contains the answer. When conceptualizing IPD, the focus should be on ‘the inclusiveness of the selectorate’ (process) rather than on the inclusiveness of ‘the group of candidates ultimately selected’ (outcome). After all, we are concerned with

IPD, and this is where the process is, *within* the party. To be sure, the outcome (the selected group of candidates) is also at the party level, but the ‘democratic relevance’ of the outcome is primarily attributable to the nation-state rather than the party. This becomes apparent in another statement of the authors: ‘highly participatory [i.e., inclusive] party decision-making, in areas such as candidate selection, may lead to less inclusive legislatures’ (Katz and Cross 2013: 172; specification in bracket and emphasis added). This means that the ‘democratic problem’ of less inclusive legislatures resides primarily at the level of the nation-state rather than the party level. As outlined above, our aim is to measure *IPD* and not to contribute to the normative debate whether *IPD* is good or necessary for a democratic political system at the nation-state level. Therefore, the conclusion that an inclusive (democratic) process of candidate selection may lead to less inclusive legislatures is irrelevant for the concept of *IPD* itself. From a strictly analytical point of view, *IPD* at the party-level and democracy at the nation-state level are two distinct concepts. Therefore, in contrast to Hazan and Rahat (2010), we follow a narrow understanding of *IPD* and thus do not consider the effects of *IPD*-procedures on the quality of democracy at the state level.³

c) The demos. The third relevant aspect for the conceptualization of *IPD* concerns the *demos*: should party members, party supporters or the entire electorate of a country be considered when judging the inclusiveness of a party organization (Cross and Katz 2013b: 4)? The answer is that, strictly speaking, the focus should lie on the (traditional) members, because—again—we are concerned with *IPD* and therefore it might be considered ‘undemocratic’ if someone outside of the party can decide what happens within the party (Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015: 569, 574). However, as we are aware of the changing nature of party membership (Gauja 2015; Scarrow 2015) our conceptualization of *IPD* also considers open primaries in which the entire electorate may participate as a special case.

Identifying Specific Components of IPD

The preceding discussion makes clear that we need to develop a conceptualization of *IPD* which focuses on the inclusiveness of intra-party politics. Furthermore, we will limit it to the process of *IPD* and disregard potential effects on outcome. Hence our measurement of *IPD* is based on three theoretically derived components (see Figure 6.1) which largely correspond to von dem Berge et al. (2013). These three components are ‘Decision-Making: Programme’, ‘Decision-Making: Personnel’ and ‘Organizational Structure’. This is consistent with the notion in research that decision-making is the most crucial element of *IPD* (e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2010; Cross and Katz 2013a; Rahat and Shapira 2016: 11).




FIGURE 6.1 IPD and its components

(1) *Decision-making: programme.* The development, formulation and implementation of policies is one of the most important functions of political parties. It is a core element in the process of interest aggregation and plays an essential role for the linkages that parties provide to the citizenry (see Hennl and Franzmann, Chapter 11 in this volume). Manifestos are the billboards of parties which they use to attract voters. Therefore, the question of who actually decides on the manifesto of a party is an important aspect of IPD. In contrast to the personnel aspects of intra-party decision-making, previous research has largely neglected the democratic quality of manifesto decision-making.⁴ The theoretical relevance for IPD is straightforward—as Gauja (2013: 117) writes, it ‘can be conceptualized as simply allowing or enabling party members to “have their say” when it comes to formulating party policy.’ This refers to the inclusiveness of the decision-making process and can be realized by plebiscitary or assembly-based means (Gauja 2013: 118).

(2) *Decision-making: personnel.* Within the component ‘personnel’ two intra-party processes are relevant: leadership selection and candidate selection (e.g., Niedermayer 1989: 15–17). To start with the first, by definition, the party leader usually is the most important person within a political party because he or she plays a major role in guiding the party, and because he or she is the key figure ‘both in the electoral and organizational activities of parties and in the legislative and executive spheres’ (Cross and Blais 2012: 145). Furthermore, as the position of the party leader usually serves as a gatekeeper to the leading executive office in a state (because a person seeking this position most often first has to become a party leader)⁵ the method by which the leader is selected is a crucial political process (Kenig 2008: 241). Therefore, the selection of the party leader is clearly one of the most important decision-making processes within a political party (Cross and Blais 2012: 145).

Similarly, there can be little doubt that candidate selection is one of the most important aspects of intra-party politics. It has even been designated as

‘one of the central defining functions of a political party in a democracy’ (Katz 2001: 278). For both processes, candidate and leadership selection, it holds that the inclusiveness of the selectorate (the body who selects the leaders and candidates) may be regarded as the most important aspect from the perspective of IPD (e.g., Cross 2008: 598; Kenig 2009: 434; Hazan and Rahat 2010: 33; Cross and Blais 2012; Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan 2013: 7).

(3) *Organizational structure*: This component of IPD deals with the formal distribution of power within a party. The party congress plays an important role here, because it is usually the main rule-making body in an inclusive party (usually also in parties with plebiscitary elements). For example, who is able to vote in the congress is clearly important: local delegates, regional delegates or all party members? Another important question is how often a congress is held (Rudzio 2006: 148). Clearly, a party that holds frequent party congresses provides for more grass roots involvement and hence for more inclusive intra-party decision-making compared to a party holding infrequent party congresses. In addition, the prerogatives and accountability of the party leader are important features of IPD (von dem Berge et al. 2013: 10f.). For example, it is an indication of exclusiveness if the party leader has great power over the other party bodies.

With respect to the decision-making components, we are interested in who has the final say (or the final vote), be it on the manifesto, on the selection of candidates or on the selection of the party leader. Of course, other questions are important, for example, who is in charge of writing the party manifesto. But in order not to overload the concept and our measurement, we focus only on the most important aspect of intra-party decision-making and this is who votes last.⁶ This corresponds to positions on IPD taken by others. Carty, for example, argues that the core question regarding IPD is who has the real basic power when hard decisions are to be taken, the members or the elites (Carty 2013: 25). Similarly, according to Cross and Katz (2013b: 10), the ultimate questions regarding IPD are ‘to what extent, how, and in which aspects of party life the members are able to control what their party does’; the final decisions define the outcomes of such processes. This is basically what we mean with inclusiveness, and it can happen via representative bodies like a party congress or through plebiscitary means.

MEASURING INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Three Indices of Intra-party Democracy

As we have argued above, there are two fundamentally different logics of decision-making based on assemblies or plebiscites, which result in two

theoretically distinct dimensions of IPD. Furthermore, we need to consider the possibility that plebiscitary decision-making may be open to non-party members. This leads us to three indices of IPD which we will briefly describe here before we turn to details of the index construction (see also Appendix A6.1–3).

a) The assembly-based IPD index (AIPD). The AIPD index measures inclusiveness for the three essential components of IPD, namely decision-making over programme, personnel selection (leaders and candidates) and organizational structure. In a nutshell, the AIPD index measures the inclusiveness of decision-making inside parties that is based on discussions within party bodies and assemblies. In other words, it combines two aspects, namely the maintenance of organizational boundaries and decision-making based on the exchange of arguments within designated party bodies. It also includes assemblies of all members (e.g., at the constituency level). Hence it is not confined to representative decision-making, but it requires the temporal coincidence of discussion and decision. A higher index score indicates that a more inclusive assembly or party body has the final say on decisions over personnel and policy, and intra-organizational power is less top-heavy.

b) The plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD). The PIPD index measures the degree to which parties allow for decision-making concerning programme writing and personnel selection based on the plebiscitary logic of one-member-one-vote.⁷ Plebiscitary decision-making disconnects the process of discussion and deliberation from the actual decision which is eventually taken by the lone party member at his or her desk or computer screen. We contend that this is a fundamentally different logic as there is no way to deliberate and reach compromise (frequently through repeated rounds of voting). It is the politics of ‘either/or’. Even though formally the members decide, it is dichotomous politics which arguably gives a lot of power to the leaders (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). On the other hand, it may also be used as a leadership-challenging device. What counts for us is that it follows an inherently different logic compared to assembly-based decision-making (Cross and Katz 2013b: 6).

c) The open plebiscitary IPD index (OPIPD). The OPIPD index also includes non-party members in decision-making. This is a special variant of PIPD which is, strictly speaking, no longer IPD because it transcends the boundaries of IPD. There is no longer an ‘intra’ because everybody is allowed to participate.

Patterns of Intra-party Democracy

Both assembly-based and plebiscitary variants of IPD can be distinguished as regards their levels of inclusiveness. Naturally, the variance is larger for

assembly-based IPD because decision-making may be restricted to the higher echelons of the party hierarchy or it may be devolved to grassroots assemblies. Plebiscitary IPD, by its very nature, tends to be dichotomous. In other words, decision-making is either plebiscitary or not. Yet, the types of decisions that are taken by plebiscites can vary in that they may be applicable to all, few or very selective kinds of decision the party has to take. As all parties, with very few exceptions, have an organization that includes one or more layers of executive committees and conferences, a certain portion of their organizational decisions will be made by more or less inclusive groups of people following the logic of assembly-based IPD. This means that virtually all parties will have a score on the AIPD index even if they have shifted all personnel and programmatic decisions to plebiscites. In other words, saving some conspicuous exceptions such as the Italian Five-Star Movement, parties always have an element of assembly-based IPD. In contrast, many parties have no plebiscitary provisions (much less open plebiscites). Hence, the democratic quality of assembly-based organizational decision-making is the core of IPD and the other variants are modifications. However, these variants are not simply 'add-ons', because they transform the nature of intra-party decision-making.

If we disregard the case of the open plebiscitary mode of IPD, which represents an empirically rare special case of plebiscitary IPD (see also Cross and Pilet 2015), we can distinguish between four different modes of IPD (see Figure 6.2). As all plebiscites require some kind assembly-based intra-party decision-making in order to decide about the substance of the plebiscite, the latter can be combined with more or less inclusive assembly-based decision-making. In other words, plebiscites can be the result of relatively exclusive decisions made by a small circle of party leaders or they can be initiated by the party on the ground. While the elite-driven version is likely to empower the party elites (Katz and Mair 1995: 21), the grassroots plebiscitary initiative is likely to have the opposite effect. Figure 6.2 shows that we can theoretically expect four combinations of the degree of plebiscitary and assembly-based IPD: The upper left quadrant (I) would largely correspond to the traditional mass party characterized by a (at least formally) high degree of assembly-based IPD and few opportunities for plebiscitary decision-making. Moving clockwise to the upper right side (II), we find parties which combine a high degree of intra-organizational, representative democracy with many provisions for party plebiscites. The lower right-hand quadrant (III) depicts the cartel party as described by Katz and Mair, who maintained that this party type would be characterized by a strong party elite and the marginalization of party activists through plebiscites. Finally, the lower left side (IV) echoes the traditional cadre party characterized by low degrees of AIPD and PIPD. To be sure, we should not read too much into Figure 6.2 as we focus on one aspect of party organization and this is certainly insufficient to




FIGURE 6.2 Patterns of intra-party democracy

embark on a discussion of possible party types.⁸ However, it shows that different combinations of these two principal variants of IPD are possible. It remains an empirical question to what degree they can be found in modern parties. Hence, we need valid measurements of both variants of IPD. This will be our task in the subsequent sections.

Data and Item Selection

For the measurement of our three IPD indices we draw on the PPDB Project, which collected data on 122 party organizations across 19 modern democracies. We regard IPD as a continuum (Saglie and Heidar 2004: 388). Our IPD indices consist of items covering the ‘official story’ and the ‘real story’ (Katz and Mair 1992). The official story is captured by items which focus on party statutes and the real story by items focusing on processes going on in real life party events. We include both because some processes are not regulated in party statutes, which is why the PPDB project includes, as far as possible, items capturing the real story. Where we have data on the official and the real story, we use the real story items because it is closer to reality (Rahat and Shapira 2016: 13). Otherwise, we use the official story as a good estimate.

The selection of relevant PPDB items is largely based on theoretical considerations following von dem Berge et al. (2013). Each relevant PPDB item is assigned to one of the three IPD components as illustrated in Figure 6.1

(see also Appendices 6.1–3). A document explaining the index construction is also available on the PPDB website (<<https://www.politicalpartydb.org/>>), where we explain in detail the theoretical rationale of the item selection and the assignment of scores to individual items. The general logic of this quantification is described in the following sub-section.

Quantification

Our AIPD index is based on relevant PPDB variables which were recoded according to their bearing on the inclusiveness of intra-party decision-making. As a rule, we coded variable items as 0.00 or 0.25 if they indicate that a given party has no or a modest level of inclusiveness on this specific aspect of IPD; 0.50 was allocated for a medium level and 0.75 and 1.00 for high levels of inclusiveness. In some cases, this involved ranking party arenas first according to their inclusiveness. Table 6.1 illustrates the logic: a party where the party congress has a final vote on the manifesto has the highest score on this particular aspect while a party where the leader has the final word is considered to be least inclusive.⁹

The AIPD index is made up of three components (i.e., manifesto writing, personnel-selection, and organizational structure) for which we have a different number of variables. In order to weigh them equally, we have first calculated a score for each component; the final AIPD index-value is then the arithmetic mean of the three components. Table A6.1 in the appendix shows all items that have been used. As it is impossible to document all coding rules in this appendix, please refer to the PPDB website for a detailed documentation. The construction of the PIDP and the OIPD indices is less complex because we have fewer variables and they are dichotomous in that they measure whether or not all party members or supporters have a final vote on party matters. The values of the final index scores are simply the arithmetic means of all included IPD variables (see Appendix A6.2 and A6.3 for details).

TABLE 6.1 *Ranking and quantification of the IPD variable 'manifesto vote' (AIPD-Index)*

PPDB item	IPD value	Effect on IPD
Party congress	1.00	Pro IPD
—	0.75	
Party legislators	0.50	Not explicitly pro/contra IPD
Executive committee	0.25	
Party leader	0.00	Contra IPD

Question: 'Who has a vote on adopting the final manifesto?'

Further Considerations: Defining the Indices more Precisely

Our IPD measures represent ‘indices’ rather than ‘scales’ because they are composed of indicators (or groups of indicators) which measure different characteristics (dimensions) of the underlying theoretical construct while scales use multiple indicators related to the same dimension (Andreas 2001; Latcheva and Davidov 2014: 745–7). In our IPD indices these different dimensions are the three components presented in Figure 6.1.

The quantification method presented above is in fact an example of an additive-cumulative index based on mean values of the individual indicators.¹⁰ Thus, our indices are *formative indices* rather than *reflective* ones (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Coltman et al. 2008; Diamantopoulos, Riefler, and Roth 2008: 1204). While in a reflective model the latent construct exists independently of the measures, in a formative model, the latent construct is a combination of its measures and is formed by the scholar on the basis of theoretical justifications (Coltman et al. 2008: 1251). This means that individual measures of a reflective index must correlate while this is not a requirement for a formative index (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, and Roth 2008: 1205). If one of the component-values of a formative index increases, the overall index-value also increases; but if the overall index-value increases, this is not necessarily accompanied by an increase in each of the individual component-values (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001: 270f.). Thus, regarding the overall index-value, a low value of Component A can be balanced by a higher value of Component B. In the end, the sum of the measures represents the latent variable. The PPDB items are combined to form IPD variables, which are further combined to tap one of the IPD components. Therefore, the final AIPD score is the sum of all these components, which can vary independently of each other.¹¹

INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN THE REAL WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW

We will return to these measures in Chapter 7, where we analyse causes and consequences of AIPD and provide a detailed breakdown of AIPD and PIPD scores for all parties included in our study. However, the preceding theoretical discussion, conceptualization, and development of empirical measurements would be incomplete without an initial empirical exploration into the territory of IPD. Our first result is somewhat surprising. Even though open primaries regularly attract widespread attention, they have so far remained a rare exception. In the period we examine, only four out of 122 parties had rules that facilitate the participation of non-members in decisions over the party

manifesto, individual policies or the elections of leaders.¹² In other words, when it comes to participating in relevant decisions, most parties still regard their dues-paying membership as the relevant demos. Arguably the two most conspicuous cases, namely the election of Matteo Renzi as leader of the Italian Democrats and Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the UK Labour Party, happened after our study was in the field, and have thus not been included here.

Hence, we will now focus on the two variants of IPD which are *intra-party* in the traditional sense in that they adhere to the boundary of the membership organization as the basis of participation rights in decisions over party affairs (AIPD and PIPD). At the current stage, we can use the PPDB data only for cross-sectional analyses, drawing on data that has been collected for round 1 of the project covering one or more years between 2011 and 2014. In order to reduce missing data, we have always used the most recent data available (usually 2014). Furthermore, despite our argument that the indices are formative rather than reflective, we found it empirically justifiable to include parties for which the AIPD values are only based on two of the three components; the component ‘decision-making: programme’ produced a large number of missing values.¹³ This problem will gradually reduce with subsequent waves of data collection.

Figure 6.3 shows the frequency distributions of our two indices. As we have argued above, the AIPD index taps into the core of intra-party decision-making. All parties except the Dutch Freedom Party have a valid score on this dimension of IPD, and all of them have a minimum of AIPD—which comes as little surprise given that we are analysing parties in democratic countries. The results for the plebiscitary IPD index also conform to our expectation in that almost half of the parties (42.7 per cent) have a PIPD value of zero meaning that they have not (yet) introduced plebiscitary methods of decision-making.




FIGURE 6.3 Frequency distributions of AIPD and PIPD indices




FIGURE 6.4 Patterns of intra-party democracy

Furthermore, the distribution is discontinuous (in that not all possible values actually occur empirically), which is a result of the relatively small number of variables that compose this index (see Appendix A6.2).

The empirical results also confirm our argument that AIPD and PIPD are distinct dimensions of IPD which can be combined in different ways. Figure 6.4 adds data to our conceptualization of the dimensionality of IPD that was set out in Figure 6.2. This makes clear that parties choose different combinations of AIPD and PIPD. We have adjusted the scales to account for the fact that no party has an AIPD value below 0.26. Few parties combine low AIPD with high PIPD (quadrant III), which would be our ideal typical case of a cartel party. Instead, we find that many parties with medium to high assembly-based IPD combine this with plebiscitary measures (quadrant II). This is probably a more realistic empirical manifestation of trends towards the marginalization of party activists as was predicted by Katz and Mair. After all, it is unlikely that such parties would reduce or even abolish their traditional assembly-based decision procedures and substitute them with plebiscitary means. Instead, they simply seem to complement (or even bypass) AIPD with PIPD procedures. At the same time, we find a fairly large number of parties combining low AIPD and PIPD scores, which would conform to the traditional cadre party model (quadrant IV). Also, the traditional mass party model with a formally democratic party organization based on internal assembly-based democracy is empirically clearly identifiable (quadrant I).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have presented an integrated approach to measuring the level of IPD by using data of the Political Party Database Project (PPDB). In this respect, our main goal has been to make a contribution to the empirical measurement of IPD rather than to the normative discussion about whether IPD is desirable or not for political parties and democratic political systems. But of course, the data we presented in this chapter can be used to contribute to this normative debate. Furthermore, compared to the few existing measures of IPD, our concept and measurement includes an important innovation: the distinction between different conceptual dimensions of IPD which result empirically in different IPD indices. Most important is the distinction between an assembly-based variant of IPD and a plebiscitary variant of IPD.

Some scholars argue that party elites may implement plebiscitary methods of intra-party decision-making processes in order to reduce the power of rank-and-file activists and increase their own control by empowering the docile and passive members (Marsh 1993; Mair 1994; Katz 2002; Rahat 2013). This is most apparent in the cartel thesis, which interprets the introduction of membership ballots as ‘enhanced leadership autonomy’ because such plebiscites can easily ‘be manipulated by oligarchic elites’ (Saglie and Heidar 2004). On this reading the implementation of (open) primaries might lead to a more oligarchic party leadership (Saglie and Heidar 2004). In the same vein, primaries have been seen as a means of providing national party elites with the opportunity to lower the power of intermediate party structures and thereby increase their own power (Hopkin 2001). While this is all convincing, our results indicate that plebiscitary intra-party decision-making may be combined in several ways with traditional, assembly-based IPD. When high levels of AIPD and PIPD are combined this does not necessarily empower party leaders. On the contrary, it is more plausible that plebiscitary measures may also be used as a tool of the party rank and file to challenge the power of the leadership. After all, the combination of high levels of AIPD and PIPD introduces two competing logics of legitimacy into intra-party politics, namely legitimation by a more or less inclusive assembly and by the membership (or supporters) at large. It is easy to envisage political constellations where these two logics clash, for example, when a coalition deal is put to a ballot after it has been agreed by the parliamentary party and the party leadership, or when a parliamentary party vote favours one candidate for leadership while the membership chooses another. These scenarios show that the political effects of specific formal power constellations are highly dependent on the political context.

APPENDIX: THE INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY INDICES

TABLE A6.1 *Composition of assembly-based IPD index (AIPD)*

IPD Component	Decision-making: <i>Programme</i>	Decision-making: <i>Personnel</i>	Organizational structure
IPD variables (PPDB items)	Who has the final vote on the manifesto?	(1a) Are rules for the selection of the party leader existent? (1b) Who has the final vote in the party leader selection process? (1c) Was there a vote at the most inclusive stage of the party leader selection process? (1d) Who was eligible to participate in this vote (referring to previous question)? (2) Who has the final vote in the candidate selection process?	Who is eligible to vote at the party congress? How frequently must a party congress be held? Who has ex officio seats with full voting rights in the party's highest executive body? Prerogatives and accountability of the party leader?
IPD score component	Variable score = component score	Arithmetic mean of (1) 'party leader selection variables' and (2) 'candidate selection variable'	Arithmetic mean of all 'organizational structure variables'
AIPD score final	Arithmetic mean of the components 'DM: programme', 'DM: personnel' and 'organizational structure'		

Note: 1b and d partially overlap. We have decided to keep both variables to improve precision. For a detailed explanation of the index construction see the explanatory document on the PPDB website <<https://www.politicalpartydb.org/>>. For the AIPD and PIPD index values of each party see appendix of Ch. 7 and PPDB website.

TABLE A 6.2 *Composition of plebiscitary IPD index (PIPD)*

IPD component	IPD variables (PPDB items)
Decision-making: <i>Programme and issues</i>	Do all party members have a vote on the manifesto? Are there intra-party policy ballots in which all party members vote on policy issues?
Decision-making: <i>Personnel</i>	Do all party members have a vote in the party leader selection process? Do all party members have the final vote in the candidate selection process?
Organizational structure	No items/variables
PIPD score	Arithmetic mean of all variables

TABLE A 6.3 *Composition of open plebiscitary IPD index (OPIPD)*

IPD component	IPD variables (PPDB items)
Decision-making: <i>Programme and issues</i>	Do non-member party supporters have a vote on adopting the final manifesto? Are there policy ballots in which non-member party supporters vote in decisions on policy issues?
Decision-making: <i>Personnel</i>	Do non-member party supporters have a vote in the party leader selection process? No items/variables on candidate selection
Organizational structure	No items/variables
OPIPD score	Arithmetic mean of all variables

NOTES

1. To be sure, the British Labour Party model operated on a modified principle by allowing for collective membership which meant that membership was only indirect and trade union leaders exercised political rights within the party on behalf of their membership (traditionally without asking them for their position).
2. Just to name a few of them: Democracy Barometer, Polity IV Database, Combined Index of Democracy (CID), Freedom in the World Database, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).
3. The following statement of Hazan and Rahat (2010) makes this point even clearer: ‘the questions “which is the most democratic candidate selection method?” and “which is the best candidate selection method for democracy?” are not identical, and could be answered differently based on how one perceives democracy. If democracy is equivalent to inclusive participation, then the answer to the first question is clearly the most inclusive candidate selection method – but this is not necessarily the correct answer to the second question.’
4. Exceptions are von dem Berge et al. 2013, Gauja 2013, and Rahat and Shapira 2016.
5. This is different in some presidential systems.
6. Therefore, whenever the phrasing in the PPDB questionnaire allowed for it, we included in the indices which party body has the ‘final’ vote. When the phrasing in

- the questionnaire only included the term ‘vote’ (and not ‘final vote’), then we had to be satisfied with this.
7. Note that the component ‘organizational structure’ is not relevant for plebiscitary IPD (see next section).
 8. Party typologies usually draw on considerations of resource distribution, the relationship between the three faces of party organization or the size of the membership.
 9. The value 0.75 is not assigned for this variable, because there is no PPDB-item corresponding to this IPD value. A theoretically possible item for the 0.75-value would be ‘party sub-units’ having a vote on the manifesto, because there would be more party members involved than in the case of ‘party legislators’ decisions and fewer party members than in ‘party congress’ decisions.
 10. ‘Cumulative’ because some variables are generated on the basis of rankings, which can be defined as ‘sub-indices’. A cumulative index is defined as an index consisting of multiple sub-indices (Croissant and Thiery 2000: 106).
 11. The definition of the particular form of index is not only of abstract theoretical importance; it also has empirical consequences. For instance, in contrast to formative indices, reflective indices can be constructed by factor analyses. Also, the conventional procedures to measure validity and reliability cannot be applied to formative indices. Thus, internal consistency is not a quality criterion for formative indices because (as mentioned above) the individual components do not have to correlate with each other. Instead, the quality of a formative index is largely defined by the quality of the theoretical concept on which the index is based. Concerning this matter, a formative index should consist of all theoretically relevant components which measure the latent variable (Bollen 1989: 222; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001: 271ff.). A change in the components leads to a change in the latent variable (Coltman et al. 2008: 1252 ff.). To be sure, the PPDB group integrated as many relevant items as possible but an ideal data set for measuring our variants of IPD might well include more variables.
 12. Liberal Party, Federalists, Democrats, Francophones (Belgium); United Left (Spain); Liberal Party (Canada). The first round of the PPDB project did not include an item on candidate selection open to non-members.
 13. Excluding all parties with a missing value on the component ‘manifesto’ would have reduced the number of cases to sixty-one. We have decided to include cases with missing values on one component as the correlation between the two versions of the AIPD index is 0.843.

REFERENCES

- Allern, Elin H. and Karina Pedersen. 2007. ‘The Impact of Party Organisational Changes on Democracy’. *West European Politics*, 30(1): 68–92.
- Amundsen, Inge. 2016. ‘Democratic Dynasties? Internal Party Democracy in Bangladesh’. *Party Politics*, 22(2): 49–58.

- Andreß, Hans-Jürgen. 2001. *Glossar zur Datenerhebung und statistischen Analyse*. Online-Glossar: <<http://eswf.uni-koeln.de/glossar/stichwor.htm>> (accessed 29 February 2016).
- Berge, Benjamin von dem, Thomas Poguntke, Peter Obert, and Diana Tipei. 2013. *Measuring Intra-Party Democracy. A Guide for the Content Analysis of Party Statutes with Examples from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia*. Heidelberg: Springer Briefs in Political Science.
- van Biezen, Ingrid and Daniela R. Piccio. 2013. 'Shaping Intra-Party Democracy: On the Legal Regulation of Internal Party Organizations'. In William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 27–48.
- Bille, Lars. 2001. 'Democratizing a Democratic Procedure: Myth or Reality?' *Party Politics*, 7(3): 363–80.
- Bollen, Kenneth A. 1989. *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*. New York: Wiley.
- Carty, R. Kenneth. 2013. 'Are Political Parties Meant to Be Internally Democratic?' In William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11–26.
- Coltman, Tim, Timothy M. Devinney, David F. Midgley, and Sunil Venaik. 2008. 'Formative versus Reflective Measurement Models. Two Applications of Formative Measurement'. *Journal of Business Research*, 61(12): 1250–62.
- Croissant, Aurel and Peter Thiery. 2000. 'Defekte Demokratie. Konzept, Operationalisierung und Messung'. In Hans-Joachim Lauth, Gert Pickel, and Christian Welzel (eds), *Demokratiemessung. Konzepte und Befunde im internationalen Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 89–111.
- Cross, William P. 2008. 'Democratic Norms and Party Candidate Selection. Taking Contextual Factors into Account'. *Party Politics*, 14(5): 596–619.
- Cross, William P. and Andre Blais. 2012. 'Who Selects the Party Leader?' *Party Politics*, 18(2): 127–50.
- Cross, William P. and Richard S. Katz. 2013a. *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cross, William P. and Richard S. Katz. 2013b. 'The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy'. In William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–10.
- Cross, William P. and Jean-Benoit Pilet. 2015. 'Parties, Leadership Selection, and Intra-Party Democracy'. In: William P. Cross and Jean-Benoit Pilet (eds), *The Politics of Party Leadership*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 165–73.
- Diamantopoulos, Adamantios, Petra Riefler, and Katharina P. Roth. 2008. 'Advancing Formative Measurement Models'. *Journal of Business Research*, 61(12): 1203–18.
- Diamantopoulos, Adamantios and Heidi M. Winklhofer. 2001. 'Index Construction with Formative Indicators. An Alternative to Scale Development'. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 38(2): 269–77.
- Gauja, Anika. 2013. 'Policy Development and Intra-Party Democracy'. In William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 116–35.
- Gauja, Anika. 2015. 'The Construction of Party Membership'. *European Journal of Political Research*, 54(2): 232–48.

- Hazan, Reuven Y. and Gideon Rahat. 2010. *Democracy within Parties. Candidate Selection Methods and their Political Consequences*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Held, David. 1996, 2nd edn. *Models of Democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hopkin, Jonathan. 2001. 'Bringing the Members Back In? Democratizing Candidate Selection in Britain and Spain'. *Party Politics*, 7(3): 343–61.
- Indriðason, Indriði H. and Gunnar Helgi Kristinnsson. 2015. 'Primary Consequences. The Effects of Candidate Selection through Party Primaries in Iceland'. *Party Politics*, 21(4): 565–76.
- Katz, Richard S. 2001. 'The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy'. *Party Politics*, 7(3): 277–96.
- Katz, Richard S. 2002. 'The Internal Life of Parties'. In Kurt Richard Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds), *Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and Analytical Challenges*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–118.
- Katz, Richard S. and William P. Cross. 2013. 'Problematising Intra-Party Democracy'. In William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 170–6.
- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1992. 'Introduction: The Cross-National Study of Party Organizations'. In Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds), *Party Organizations. A Data Handbook on Party Organizations in Western Democracies, 1960–90*. London/Newbury Park, CA/New Delhi: Sage, 1–20.
- Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party'. *Party Politics*, 1(1): 5–28.
- Kenig, Ofer. 2008. 'Democratization of Party Leadership Selection. Do Wider Selectorates Produce more Competitive Contests?' *Electoral Studies*, 28(2): 240–7.
- Kenig, Ofer. 2009. 'Classifying Party Leaders' Selection Methods in Parliamentary Democracies'. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 19(4): 433–47.
- Kenig, Ofer, Gideon Rahat, and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2013. *Leadership Selection versus Candidate Selection in Parliamentary Democracies. Similarities and Differences*. Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference. Sciences Po Bordeaux, 4–7 September 2013.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1988. 'Organization and Strategy of Belgian and West German Ecology Parties. A New Dynamic of Party Politics in Western Parties'. *Comparative Politics*, 20(2): 127–54.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2005. *Direct Democratic Choice*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner. 1990. 'The Origin of Political Parties'. In Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 25–30.
- Latcheva, Rossalina and Eldad Davidov. 2014. 'Skalen und Indizes'. In Nina Baur and Jörg Blasius (eds), *Handbuch Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 745–56.
- Mair, Peter. 1994. 'Party Organizations. From Civil Society to the State'. In Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds), *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London: Sage, 1–22.
- Marsh, Michael. 1993. 'Introduction. Selecting the Party Leader'. *European Journal of Political Research*, 24(3): 229–31.

- Michels, Robert. 1989 (1st edn 1911). *Soziologie des Parteiwesens*. Stuttgart: Kröner.
- Neumann, Sigmund. 1956. 'Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties'. In Sigmund Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties. Approaches to Comparative Politics*. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 395–421.
- Niedermayer, Oskar. 1989. *Innerparteiliche Partizipation*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Poguntke, Thomas. 1987. 'The Organization of a Participatory Party – The German Greens'. *European Journal of Political Research*, 15: 609–33.
- Rahat, Gideon. 2013. 'What is Democratic Candidate Selection?' In William P. Cross and Richard S. Katz (eds), *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 136–49.
- Rahat, Gideon and Assaf Shapira. 2016. 'An Intra-Party Democracy Index. Theory, Design and a Demonstration'. *Parliamentary Affairs*, Online First: 1–27.
- Rudzio, Wolfgang. 2006. *Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. 7th edn. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Saglie, Jo and Knut Heidar. 2004. 'Democracy within Norwegian Political Parties – Complacency or Pressure for Change?' *Party Politics*, 10(4), 385–405.
- Scarrow, Susan E. 1999. 'Parties and the Expansion of Direct Democracy: Who Benefits?' *Party Politics*, 5(3): 341–62.
- Scarrow, Susan E. 2005. 'Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives. Implementing Intra-Party Democracy'. National Institute for International Affairs (NDI): <https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/1951_polpart_scarrow_110105_5.pdf> (accessed 16 January 2017).
- Scarrow, Susan E. 2015. *Beyond Party Members. Changing Approaches to Partisan Mobilization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1950. *Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie*. Bern: A. Francke.
- Stöss, Richard. 2001. 'Parteienstaat oder Parteiendemokratie?' In Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer, and Richard Stöss (eds), *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland*, 2nd edn. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 13–35.
- Young, Lisa and William Cross. 2002. 'The Rise of Plebiscitary Democracy in Canadian Political Parties'. *Party Politics*, 8(6): 673–99.